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Introduction 
The objective of this article is to contribute to two fields of scholarship and debate. 
Conceptually, it advances the literature on ‘special relationships’ in International 
Relations.1 Empirically, it furthers our understanding of the German-Israeli relationship 
which stands out as one of the most remarkable cases of special relationships in 
international politics.2 To that twofold purpose, the article suggests studying special 
relationships in general and the relations between Germany and Israel in particular from 
an ontological security perspective.3 
                                                          
1 Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Special Relationships in Foreign Policy’, in Cameron Thies (ed.), The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 
710-22.  
2 Lily Gardner Feldman, Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). 
3 Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 12:3 (2006a), pp. 341-70; Brent J. Steele, Ontological 
  
 
The article starts out from the assumption that states are motivated by ontological 
security seeking and it regards special relationships as a means of states to fulfil their 
ontological security needs. Such a theoretical angle promises to address three important 
gaps in our understanding of special relationships. These relate to the emergence and 
stability of special relationships, the processes and practices by which states keep their 
relations up over time and the power relations within them. The article makes the case 
that the concept of ontological security illuminates blind spots in existing works that 
conceptualise special relationships in terms of the material power relations, convergent 
interests, institutionalised interactions or similar normative outlooks between the 
partners.4  
In the empirical analysis, the article foregrounds in particular Germany’s attachment to 
the special relationship. It argues that zooming in on Germany’s reliance for its 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State (Routledge: London, 2008); Ayşe 
Zarakol, ‘States and Ontological Security: A Historical Rethinking’, Cooperation and Conflict, 52:1 
(2017), pp. 48-68. 
4 Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Special Relationships: Sonderbeziehungen als analytische Brücke zwischen 
Außenpolitik und internationalen Beziehungen’, in Sebastian Harnisch, Klaus Brummer and Kai 
Oppermann (eds.), Sonderbeziehungen als Nexus zwischen Außenpolitik und internationalen 
Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), pp. 25-52. 
  
 
ontological security on what leading German decision-makers describe as the “miracle”5 
of German-Israeli relations sheds new light on three important dimensions of the 
relationship. Specifically, the analytical perspective of the article provides distinct 
insights into how the relationship was established after the Holocaust and how it has 
endured in the face of major international and domestic transformations; the politics of 
maintaining the special relationship; and Israel’s ability to exert influence within the 
relationship.    
The article begins with a short discussion to clarify our understanding of the concept of 
special relationships in international politics. The next section identifies German-Israeli 
relations as a prime example of such special relationships. We then move on to relate 
the concept of ontological security to the study of special relationships. Finally, we 
apply our theoretical argument to the German-Israeli case.  
 
Special Relationships in International Relations 
                                                          
5 Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier vor dem Deutschen Bundestag’, 
Berlin (7 May 2015), available at: {http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2015/150507-BM_BT_D_ISR.html} accessed 15 November 2017; 
Die Welt‚ ‘Was sich in 50 Jahren ereignet hat, ist ein Wunder’, (12 May 2015), available at: 
{http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article140864287/Was-sich-in-50-Jahren-ereignet-hat-ist-ein-
Wunder.html} accessed 15 November 2017. 
  
 
Ever since Winston Churchill described the relations between Britain and the United 
States as a special relationship in his famous “iron curtain” speech on 5 March 1946, 
the term has become widely used in political and academic discourse. While most 
attention has focused on the ‘specialness’ of the Anglo-American relationship6, the term 
has, apart from the German-Israeli relationship under study here, also been applied to, 
for example, the relations of the United States to Canada7 and Australia8 as well as to 
Germany’s relations to France and Poland.9 However, the popularity of the concept 
exceeds its analytical clarity or precision. Since definitions of the concept are often ad-
hoc and unsystematic, it remains surprisingly vague and ambiguous. Still, existing 
scholarship points us to the following building blocks for a more concise working 
definition.10 While the main purpose of this article is to show how ontological security 
can benefit the study of special relationships rather than to offer a new definition of the 
                                                          
6 For example see John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War 
to Iraq, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 
7 John Sloan Dickey, Canada and the American Presence: The United States Interest in an Independent 
Canada (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 
8 Klaus Brummer, ‘Die Sonderbeziehung zwischen Australien und den USA: ‚All the Way‘?’, in 
Sebastian Harnisch, Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann (eds.), Sonderbeziehungen als Nexus zwischen 
Außenpolitik und internationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), pp. 81-105. 
9 Feldman (2012).  
10 See also Harnisch (2018). 
  
 
concept of special relationships, this working definition clarifies and consolidates the 
key characteristics of the concept and should thus be helpful for future research in the 
area.   
First, the concept of special relationships starts out from a state-centric perspective on 
international politics. While the term has occasionally been applied to relationships 
which include non-state actors11, it is predominantly taken to refer exclusively to 
relations between states. What is more, the concept tends to be used with reference to 
relations between exactly two states and thus denotes a particular subset of bilateral 
interstate relations.12 
Second, special relationships are particularistic and rest on a logic of inclusion and 
exclusion. They express a qualitative difference between the relations of states inside 
and outside of them. Although special relationships involve the demarcation from other 
states, they do not necessarily rely on processes of “negative othering”.13 In other 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Siegfried Schieder, ‘Solidarität als konstitutives Element von Sonderbeziehungen: 
Frankreich und Schweden in den Cotonou-Verhandlungen’, in Sebastian Harnisch, Klaus Brummer and 
Kai Oppermann (eds.), Sonderbeziehungen als Nexus zwischen Außenpolitik und internationalen 
Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), pp. 261-86. 
12 Lily Gardner Feldman, The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel (Boston: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1984). p. 7. 
13 Jutta Weldes, Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
  
 
words, special relationships exclude other states, but they do not in the first instance 
define themselves against other states.14 What is important, however, is that the 
members of a special relationship recognise the specialness of the relationship and that 
they ascribe particular significance to it relative to their relations with other states. 
Similarly, the special character of a relationship tends to be acknowledged also by 
outsiders to the relationship. Since special relations are therefore implicitly defined in 
comparison to a state’s other relationships, states can always only have a limited 
number of relations which qualify as special.  
Third, special relationships distinguish themselves positively from other relationships. 
They are typically regarded as being particularly close, cooperative, trustful and 
intimate.15 This is not to deny that relationships between states may also negatively 
distinguish themselves from other relationships in the sense of being particularly 
                                                          
14 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International’, 
Millennium, 35:3 (2007), p. 659. 
15 In many special relationships that entails a moral and historical dimension. While this dimension is 
particularly strong in the German-Israeli case, it is also present, for example, in the special relationships 
between Germany and Poland or the UK and India. Other special relationships – such as the Anglo-
American case – are less defined by historical guilt but still derive a sense of solidarity from a shared 
history. 
  
 
confrontational or hostile. Relationships of enmity16 and “enduring rivalries”17 are cases 
in point.18 However, such “negative” relationships are not normally discussed as special 
relationships.  
Finally, an important characteristic of special relationships is their durability and 
endurance. Members of special relationships as well as outsiders do not regard them as 
partnerships of a temporary nature, but rather as relatively stable social institutions in 
international politics. What should therefore be seen as a critical litmus test of special 
relationships is their capacity to withstand crises and to outlive shifts in the interests and 
capabilities of its members.19  
In view of these four building blocks of special relations, our working definition 
understands special relationships as exclusive and relatively durable bilateral relations 
between states in the international system which are recognised by its members and by 
outsiders as being qualitatively distinct and as distinguishing themselves positively from 
other interstate relations in international politics.  
                                                          
16 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp. 260-3. 
17 Steve Chan, Enduring Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
18 See Harnisch (2015). 
19 Feldman (1984), p. 252; Janice Bially-Mattern, ‘The Power Politics of Identity’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 7:3 (2001), pp. 349-97. 
  
 
The concept of special relationships thus promises to capture a particular type of 
relations between states in international politics. The study of such relationships is 
located on the interaction level of analysis in-between the unit and the structural level. 
This level of analysis focuses attention on patterns of interaction between states which 
can neither be fully accounted for by the attributes of the interacting units nor deduced 
from the macro-structure of the international system. For one thing, special relationships 
are social institutions that are being created, reproduced and potentially transformed by 
the foreign policy practices of their members. At the same time, they are practices of 
interaction which constitute the micro-structure of the international system. They shape 
the identities and interests of their members and contribute to the production and re-
production of the macro-structures of the international system.20  
Moreover, it is important to note that the concept of special relationships is closely 
related to but analytically distinct from friendship in international politics.21 Unlike 
friendships, special relationships do not presuppose an understanding of partners as 
equals but can include asymmetric relations between states which recognise each other 
as junior and senior partners. Also, special relationships do not necessarily have to 
                                                          
20 Wendt (1999), pp. 145-50. 
21 Evgeny Roshchin, ‘The Concept of Friendship: From Princes to States’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 12:4 (2006), pp. 599-624; Graham M. Smith, ‘Friendship and the World of 
States’, International Politics 48:1 (2011), pp. 10-27. 
  
 
operate on a primarily non-utilitarian logic of reciprocity which is essential to true 
friendship, 22 but can involve more strategic expectations. In this sense, the concept of 
special relationships is less demanding and broader than the concept of friendship.23 At 
the same time, the partners to special relationships may well use the language of 
friendship24 to symbolize and reassure themselves of the special quality of their 
relationship. 
 
The German-Israeli Special Relationship 
Given our working definition of the concept, German-Israeli relations are a widely 
acknowledged example of a special relationship in international politics. Amongst other 
things, the ‘specialness’ of the partnership is reflected in the institutionalization and 
frequency of official political interactions, including annual cabinet-level meetings. 
Diplomatically, key indicators for the special quality of the relationship include 
Germany’s role as the second most important supplier of weapons to Israel and its 
support for Israel in multilateral forums such as the United Nations or the European 
                                                          
22 Berenskoetter (2007), pp. 666-7. 
23 See also Harnisch (2018), p. 711. 
24 Felix Berenskoetter and Yuri van Hoef, ‘Friendship and Foreign Policy’, in Cameron Thies (ed.), The 
Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
p. 750.  
  
 
Union. Economically, Israel is Germany’s most important trading partner in the Middle 
East, and Germany is Israel’s third most important trading partner overall. On the 
societal level, pointers to the specialness of the relationship are the broad range of well-
developed partnerships in civil society, including the German-Israeli society, the 
German-Israeli Future Forum, extensive youth exchanges and the close collaboration 
between the two countries in education and research.25 
Moreover, the German-Israeli special relationship has stood the test of time. It has 
outlived major transformations in its international environment, including the end of the 
Cold War and German unification and it has weathered various crises in German-Israeli 
relations, such as the fallout between Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Begin in 
the late 1970s, the aborted sale of German tanks to Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s or 
most recently the German criticism against Israel’s policy of settlement constructions in 
the West Bank. What all these crises have in common is that they were not only 
resolved, but quickly followed by mutual re-assurances of the specialness of German-
Israeli relations. 
                                                          
25 Muriel Asseburg and Jan Busse, ‘Deutschlands Politik gegenüber Israel’, in Thomas Jäger, Alexander 
Höse and Kai Oppermann (eds.), Deutsche Außenpolitik: Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und 
Normen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), pp. 693-716; Martin Kloke, 40 Jahre 
deutsch-israelische Beziehungen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005), available at: 
{http://www.bpb.de/izpb/25044/40-jahre-deutsch-israelische-beziehungen?p=all} accessed 4 February 
2015. 
  
 
Most significantly, the special relationship between Germany and Israel is routinely 
identified as such by both partners.26 A case in point is the 2008 visit to Israel by the 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, when both the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
and the German Chancellor praised the special quality of the relationship.27 In the words 
of Chancellor Merkel in the Knesset:  
Germany and Israel are and will always remain linked in a special way by the 
memory of the Shoah. […] Yes, our relations are special, indeed unique – 
marked by enduring responsibility for the past, shared values, mutual trust, 
abiding solidarity for one another and shared confidence.28 
                                                          
26 George Lavy, Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 
207. 
27 Ulrike Putz, ‘Merkel in the Knesset: “We would never abandon Israel”’, Spiegel online, available at: 
{http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/merkel-in-the-knesset-we-would-never-abandon-israel-a-
542311.html} accessed 4 February 2015. 
28 Deutsche Bundesregierung, ‘Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel vor der Knesset in Jerusalem’, 
Jerusalem (18 March 2008), available at: 
{http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation_alt/Anlagen-be/_Anlagen/2008-03-18-merkel-
rede-
knesset.pdf;jsessionid=28FAB9E5437BAFE87123FA640D63FBD9.s2t1?__blob=publicationFile&v=2} 
accessed 22 January 2016. 
  
 
What is more, these sentiments are widely shared by outside observers and 
commentators29 who tend to rank the relationship as one of only very few special 
relations the two countries have. For Germany, relations to Israel are seen in a line with 
two or at most three other special relations to France, the US and Poland.30 In the case 
of Israel, relations to Germany often count as its second most important special 
relationship after relations to the US.31 Few would disagree, therefore, with the 
Economist’s characterisation of German-Israeli relations as a “very special 
relationship”.32  
 
Special Relationships and Ontological Security 
As opposed to physical security, ontological security is security as being, not as 
survival.33 It refers to an actor’s “stable sense of self-identity” which comes from a 
                                                          
29 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Germany and Israel: Is It Friendship?’, LSE Ideas, 1 October 2012, available at: 
{http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/10/germany-and-israel-is-it-friendship} accessed 4 February 2015. 
30 Lily Gardner Feldman, ‘The Principle and Practice of ‚Reconciliation‘ in German Foreign Policy: 
Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic’, International Affairs, 75:2 (1999), pp. 
333-56; Günther Nonnenmacher, ‘Besondere Beziehungen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (31 January 
2010). 
31 The Economist, ‘Germany and Israel. Friends in High Places’, (22 March 2008). 
32 The Economist, ‘Germany and Israel. A Very Special Relationship’, (31 January 2015). 
33 Steele (2008), p. 51. 
  
 
“sense of continuity and order in events”.34 The agency of actors depends on such 
ontological security because it stabilises their cognitive environment and reduces 
uncertainty which is a necessary precondition for purposeful behaviour. Like physical 
security, ontological security is a primary need of any social actor because it is 
constitutive of their capacity to act.35 For Alexander Wendt, it is one of five basic 
material needs of human beings.36 
Social actors achieve a sense of ontological security by constructing coherent and 
continuous biographical narratives through which they and others reflexively 
understand their self-identity.37 They develop a “protective cocoon”38, their basic trust 
system, which allows them to bracket knowledge of potential threats to their self-
identity and serves as a kind of “emotional inoculation”39 against existential anxieties. 
                                                          
34 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), p. 54, 243. 
35 Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological 
Security’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2 (2006b), pp. 272-3. 
36 Wendt (1999), p. 131. 
37 Steele (2008), p. 10-2. 
38 Giddens (1991), p. 40. 
39 Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for 
Ontological Security’, Political Psychology, 25:4 (2004), p. 746. 
  
 
Ontologically secure actors take the basic parameters of their actions for granted and 
trust in the overall cognitive stability of their environment.  
While ontological security needs have traditionally been problematized on the level of 
individuals, a growing literature in International Relations ascribes such needs also to 
states. Since modern states are the main providers of ontological security for its citizens, 
it has been argued that it is plausible to conceptualise such states as ontological security 
seekers themselves.40 Along slightly different lines, agents who act on behalf of the 
state in international politics are expected to share a commitment to the self-identities of 
the states they represent and will thus seek to satisfy the ontological security needs of 
these states.41 States have been understood as biographical narratives which constitute 
collective national communities and embed individuals in these communities and thus 
serve the ontological security needs of both states and their citizens.42 Whichever 
rationale one adopts, the assumption that states are social actors who act in the 
international system “as if” they were ontological security-seekers43 has proven useful 
in exploring different patterns of interstate relations in international politics. For 
example, this perspective has shed new light on conflictual dynamics such as the 
                                                          
40 Zarakol (2017). 
41 Steele (2008), pp. 15-20. 
42 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Parameters of a National Biography’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 20:1 (2014), pp. 268-70. 
43 Mitzen (2006a), p. 352. 
  
 
security dilemma44 as well as on the foundations of interstate friendship45 and the 
politics of state apologies.46 While conceptualising states as ontological security-seekers 
is not uncontroversial47, the article links in with this line of research and builds on the 
assumption that states care about their ontological security. The seeking of ontological 
security is understood as a motive that can be attributed to states and that counts for or 
against certain types of state behaviour. It is important to note, however, that this does 
not imply that ontological security is necessarily an explanatory reason for policy-
makers to act in a certain way or that policy-makers consciously weigh the ontological 
security implications of their actions. This makes it quite challenging to find direct 
empirical evidence for the influence of ontological security motives. Our empirical 
analysis therefore relies on indirect evidence in the form of references and historical 
accounts in German political discourse that ideally meet the following two 
requirements: (1) They should support the notion that Germany as a collective entity (as 
opposed to only the government, political parties or single individuals)has special 
responsibilities to Israel. (2) They should explicitly or implicitly characterize the 
German-Israeli special relationship as a constitutive element of German political culture 
                                                          
44 Mitzen (2006a). 
45 Berenskoetter (2007). 
46 Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan’, 
International Relations, 24:1 (2010), pp. 3-23. 
47 Zarakol (2010), p. 3. 
  
 
or general foreign policy orientation after WWII, signalling an identity component that 
makes the special relationship indispensable for Germany’s self-conception and, thus, 
ontological security. Examples would be statements that picture the relationship as a 
‘cornerstone of German foreign policy’ or ‘raison d’état’.  Besides these methodological 
challenges, an important debate in scholarship on ontological security in International 
Relations is about whether the sources of state ontological security and insecurity are 
primarily external or internal to states.48 While psychological and individualistic 
approaches foreground reflexive self-understandings of state identity, a more 
sociological perspective prioritises the role of relationships and interactions with others 
in the ontological security process. In this debate, the article sides more with the latter 
view in that it emphasises the inherently relational character of ontological security and 
the role of predictable relationships as a source of ontological security for states.49 At 
the same time, it acknowledges that the study of a state’s international relationships 
cannot be fully separated from internal understandings of self-identity and that the two 
stand in a co-constitutive relationship to each other.50 In other words, the relationships 
                                                          
48 Zarakol (2010), pp. 6-7. 
49 Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘From Fratricide to Security Community: Re-theorising 
Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16:4 
(2013), pp. 495-6. 
50 Kinnvall (2004), pp. 747-9. 
  
 
of states with other international actors shape the self-identity of states as much as they 
are shaped by it.  
From such a sociological perspective on ontological security, in turn, one key 
mechanism on which the basic trust system of states relies is the routinisation of their 
relationships to significant others.51 Routinized relationships involve habitual patterns 
of interaction and are an important source of cognitive certainty. They are thus essential 
defences of social actors against threats to their self-identity. Since the routines 
embedded in international relationships are crucial anchors of a state’s sense of self and 
biographical narrative, they become loaded with emotional significance. States become 
attached to routinized relations in international politics because of their anxiety that on 
the other side of these routines “chaos lurks”.52 The ontological security needs of states 
are thus an important cognitive-affective stabiliser of their international relations.53 At 
the same time, the reliance of states on routinized relationships for their ontological 
security links the fulfilment of their ontological security needs to the appraisal of 
significant others and to the predictable behaviour of their partners within these 
relationships.54  
                                                          
51 Mitzen (2006a), pp. 346-7. 
52 Giddens (1991), p. 36. 
53 Mitzen (2006b), pp. 271-2. 
54 Giddens (1991), p. 38. 
  
 
More specifically, the argument of the article is that the ontological security needs of 
states can usefully be conceptualised as the most fundamental “motivational glue”55 to 
their special relationships and that this provides a promising theoretical angle for 
studying the emergence, stability and maintenance of such relationships in international 
politics as well as asymmetric power relations within them. Such an approach appears 
to have three advantages over more traditional perspectives on special relationships 
which would emphasise the role of material power capabilities, mutual interests or 
shared values and norms.56 
First, it adds to our understanding of the motivations behind the establishment of special 
relationships and is well-positioned to account for their stability and durability. For one 
thing, the argument is that states establish special relationships partly because of the 
ontological security they provide. This motive should be particularly prominent for 
states that have experienced traumatic events and insecure self-identities.57 Moreover, 
states are expected to keep special relationships up over time because they become 
attached to the routines embedded in these relationships. Notably, ontological security-
seekers should be motivated to stabilise their special relationships in particular in 
                                                          
55 Mitzen (2006b), p. 279. 
56 Harnisch (2015). 
57 Kinnvall (2004), pp. 752-7. 
  
 
critical situations58 which create “ontological stress”59 and threaten their self-identity. 
States should thus be expected to work to maintain their special relationships even if 
material or normative incentives for doing so are weak or ambiguous. 
It is precisely the endurance of special relationships in the face of crises, power shifts or 
changes in the interests or normative outlooks of their partners which is one of their 
core features and which remains a puzzle for many existing works on such 
relationships. Cases in point are studies which have long predicted the demise of the 
Anglo-American special relationship.60 In contrast, the ontological security perspective 
would emphasise the intrinsic emotional attachment of states to the cognitive certainty 
of special relationships and thus predict their stability and capacity to outlive changes in 
their environment. At the same time, states are expected to have the capacity to 
reflexively monitor the routines embedded in a special relationship and to update and 
restructure them accordingly.61 The partners of a special relationship should be able to 
cope with the uncertainties that come with such adjustments insofar as they trust that 
                                                          
58 Brent J. Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-identity: British Neutrality and the 
American Civil War’, Review of International Studies, 31:3 (2005), p. 538. 
59 Jelena Subotić, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change’, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 12:4 (2016), p. 624. 
60 John Dickie, ‘Special No More: Anglo-American Relations. Rhetoric and Reality (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994). 
61 Mitzen (2006b), pp. 350-1. 
  
 
routinized relations will be re-established and that the “specialness” of the relationship 
is not put into doubt.  
Second, the assumption of states as ontological security-seekers is useful for 
understanding a set of interrelated practices through which special relationships are 
being maintained. Specifically, the ontological security framework points to the 
importance of what is being said about special relationships in political discourse. Such 
discourse not only describes special relationships, but helps (re-)constitute them and the 
ontological security they provide.62 The reciprocal use of the language of special 
relations by the two partners is an expression of the mutual recognition of their self-
identities which serves to legitimise and validate these self-identities.63 From this 
perspective the mutual assurances and symbolic affirmations of ‘specialness’ which are 
often integral to the routines of special relationships should not be seen as 
inconsequential rhetoric and mere window-dressing. Rather, they serve the ontological 
security needs of the partners to special relationships and are thus part and parcel of the 
value they attach to their relations. At the same time, the partners to special 
relationships can employ discursive strategies to remind each other of how their self-
identities depend on the relationship. They can thus ‘shame’ each other into a behaviour 
                                                          
62 Subotić (2016), pp. 612-5. 
63 Nava Löwenheim, ‘A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International 
Relations’, Review of International Studies, 35:3 (2009), pp. 544-5. 
  
 
that is congruent with the mutual expectations in the special relationship.64 Also, the 
ontological security perspective suggests that states view domestic critics of a special 
relationship as threats to their self-identity. This might lead them to try to silence such 
‘internal strangers’65 which, in turn, contributes to maintaining the special relationship. 
Third, the concept of ontological security opens up new perspectives on power relations 
within special relationships. Specifically, the dependence of states on a special 
relationship for their ontological security may well be asymmetrical. Some states may 
have more alternative sources of their ontological security and are less vulnerable in 
their self-identity than others. One partner to a special relationship may thus be more 
attached to it than the other. What is more, states might be aware of such asymmetries 
and of what makes their partners insecure. They may thus be able to strategically exploit 
the ontological security needs of their partners in that they threaten to ‘insecuritise’ 
them.66 For example, they might challenge the self-identity of their partners by accusing 
them of violating the expectations of a special relationship. This, in turn, may ‘shame’ a 
partner into adapting its behaviour in a way that benefits the other state and sustains the 
                                                          
64 Steele (2008), pp. 50-5. 
65 Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 4:2 (1998), pp. 238-44. 
66 Steele (2008), pp. 74-5. 
  
 
special relationship.67 For one thing, such dynamics can be seen as a further stabiliser of 
special relationships. For another, they add a new dimension to attempts at 
understanding how “junior partners” to special relationships can succeed in influencing 
what are a material sense the stronger partners in such relationships.68  
 
Ontological Security Seeking and the German-Israeli Special Relationship 
The following case study on German-Israeli relations illustrates our theoretical 
argument. It is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the emergence and stability 
of the special relationship. It will argue that ontological security was an important driver 
in establishing the relationship and has been a key stabilizer of the relationship ever 
since. We also make the case that several instances of Israeli frustrations with 
Germany’s perceived lack of commitment to the special relationship point not to 
German realpolitik but to the influence of countervailing ontological security pressures 
on German decision-makers. The second part of the case study zooms in on the 
practices of maintaining the special relationship. Our argument here is that these 
practices are driven primarily by German ontological security needs and are critical in 
sustaining the relationship. Finally, we turn to the power relations between Germany 
                                                          
67 Steele (2005), p. 539. 
68 For the UK-US special relationship, see William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, ‘Reassessing the 
Special Relationship’, International Affairs, 85:2 (2009), pp. 263-84. 
  
 
and Israel and argue that Israel has benefitted from asymmetries in the ontological 
security needs of the two partners which have enabled it to secure advantageous 
bargains in the special relationship.  
 
Emergence and Stability of the German-Israeli Special Relationship 
What led to the emergence of the German-Israeli special relationship? A good starting 
point is Chancellor Adenauer’s acknowledgment of Germany’s obligation to “moral and 
material reparations” to the Jewish people as a result of their “unmeasurable” suffering 
during Nazi rule.69 On this basis, the Israeli government agreed to enter into 
negotiations that eventually led to the Luxembourg accord of September 1952. In that 
agreement, Germany committed to pay Israel 3 billion Mark over 14 years as 
compensation for losses of Jewish livelihood and property during World War II.70 
Considering the hard bargaining of the German delegation, one is easily led to discount 
any moral considerations on the German side.71 This probably applies to some German 
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decision-makers, such as Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer and financial adviser Hermann 
Josef Abs who both opposed the agreement.72 
As far as Adenauer and other government members, including the Minister for the 
Economy and later Chancellor Erhard, are concerned, however, a mixture of 
opportunistic and moral motivations seems more plausible.73 On one hand, Adenauer 
was convinced that material aid to Israel would be the price for Germany to become a 
respected member within the international community.74 On the other hand, the 
Chancellor emphasized the unique responsibility of the Federal Republic towards Israel 
in internal government communications.75 He also established a trustful, even friendly, 
relationship with the President of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldman, whom 
he assured that he regarded reparations a “honorable duty of the German people”.76 
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Adenauer ignored a sceptical public opinion and at critical junctures went against key 
figures in his cabinet and party by meeting Israeli demands.77  
During the implementation phase of the agreement, the German government made all 
efforts to fulfil its obligations, despite numerous Arab interventions.78 Furthermore, the 
nascent German-Israeli relationship passed a critical litmus test during the Suez Crisis, 
when the United States urged Germany to threaten Israel with suspending the delivery 
of goods and aid in order to force it to withdraw from the Sinai. The German 
government, however, publicly made clear that it would not even consider such a 
move.79 Rather, Adenauer, in confidential talks with the head of the Israel Mission in 
Cologne, declared Israel’s intervention legitimate.80 
The German government’s de facto positioning in favour of Israel undermined the US 
strategy of economic sanctions.81 Partly as a result of this risky decision to go against 
the will of its US protector, something that is unparalleled in the history of the Federal 
Republic’s early foreign policy, even political opponents of Adenauer confirmed the 
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authenticity of the chancellors’ commitment to Shilumim, as Ben Gurion explained to 
fellow party members: 
 My estimate [of Adenauer’s attitude] is based on information received from his 
 German and Austrian political opponents […] The Israel issue is a question of 
 conscience and religion to him.82  
German representatives in the 1950s emphasized Germany’s “moral obligation” to 
Israel and the “very special character” of the German-Israeli relationship not only in 
talks with their Israeli counterparts but also vis-á-vis third parties.83 American sources 
testified that key figures in the Adenauer administration truly believed in a moral 
obligation to Israel.84 In the mid-1950s, however, the German government was no 
longer prepared to take the initiative on establishing official German-Israeli diplomatic 
relations. While rationalist explanations would point to structural incentives from the 
bipolar international system or the importance of German-Arab business ties,  we argue  
that at the heart of the matter was a clash of German moral obligations and identity 
needs.85 West Germany’s political establishment, following historicist ideas about state- 
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and nationhood, saw the Federal Republic as a transitory entity whose primary 
responsibility was to restore German unity.86 Anything that would compromise the 
Federal Republic’s ability to speak on behalf of all Germans was to be avoided. Against 
this backdrop, Arab states threatened to recognize the GDR should West Germany 
deepen its relationship with Israel. As a result, the German leadership felt unable to 
establish official diplomatic relations with Israel without failing to meet its perceived 
obligations to Germans on both sides of the iron curtain.87 
Israel, for her part, protested not only against Germany’s indecisive diplomacy but also 
against the continued presence of German rocket scientists in Egypt and the Federal 
Republics’ unwillingness to extent the statute of limitations for murder.88 At the same 
time, it is indicative of the importance Israel attributed to the relationship that there was 
no breakup of bilateral contacts. One reason might be secret arms transfers with which 
West Germany sought to compensate Israel for its policy of non-recognition after 
1957.89 While internal documents of the German Foreign Ministry show the 
predominance of quid-pro-quo thinking behind such offers and the granting of financial 
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aid, many German parliamentarians perceived the above-mentioned issues “exclusively 
from the viewpoint of the German people’s moral burden”.90 Hence, these episodes 
show both the emergence and the limited influence of an identity component underlying 
Germany’s Israel policy up to the early 1960s.  
What contributed to the eventual decision to end the anomaly of increasingly special but 
unofficial relations was a slow readjustment of Germany’s ontological security needs 
encouraged by parts of West German civil society. Starting already in the early 1950s, 
writers, student organizations, church groups, and trade unions pushed for a new kind of 
political thinking, enabling a separate West German identity that was wedded to the 
concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘coming to terms with the past’) and a moral 
commitment to reconciliation and historical justice towards Israel.91 In the early 1960s, 
leading parliamentary figures from both major parties came out in support of the pro-
Israel movement and prioritized reconciliation over national interests and the idea of 
representing the whole German nation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch). Eventually, it was 
both the need of living up to the promise of an ethically transformed Germany and the 
prospect of increasing popular support that motivated Chancellor Erhard to change 
course, offering the exchange of ambassadors to Israel in March 1965.92 
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In the following bilateral negotiations, Germany still sought to appease Arab countries 
by refusing to publicly confirm the special character of the German-Israel relationship. 
But after Israel insisted on such a characterization, Erhard, in a note accompanying the 
agreement, affirmed that his country “was aware of the peculiar position of Germans in 
relation to Jews all over the world, including in Israel”.93 Fear of hostile Arab reactions 
also prevented the new CDU-SPD coalition government from officially siding with 
Israel in the 1967 war. Foreign Minister Brandt, however, emphasized that 
“nonintervention and neutrality in terms of international law should not be seen as 
equivalent to moral indifference and insensible hearts“.94 In order to contribute to the 
security of Israeli citizens, Germany shipped trucks and gas masks to Israel and 
logistically supported the delivery of US-manufactured weapons through German 
territory.95 Six years later in the Yom Kippur War, under different domestic and 
international circumstances, Germany not only remained silent about US weapon 
deliveries via Bremerhaven until Israel gained the upper hand, but secretly provided 
electronic equipment to Israel.96 
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While in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s German public opinion facilitated a 
deepening of political relations with Israel, from the 1970s onwards it needed to be 
occasionally side-lined in order to sustain the special relationship. The fact that German 
governments in the 1970s and 1980s refused to reconsider their relationship with Israel 
despite growing domestic criticism particularly against Israel’s occupation of the West 
Bank lends further credibility to the argument that ontological security seeking had 
emerged as a significant driver behind Germany’s policy towards Israel. In addition, 
Germany, because of its oil-dependency, faced strong economic incentives to side with 
Arab countries and to withdraw support from Israel. Yet Chancellor Brandt, even 
though he promoted a “balanced approach” in the Middle East and pursued the 
reestablishment of official diplomatic relations with Arab states on numerous occasions 
reemphasized the special character of German-Israeli relations.97 
In particular, his historic gesture of humility toward the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprisings in December 1970 gained him much respect in Tel Aviv. This was true also 
for his Cologne speech of 1971 in which he countered allegations that Israel would be a 
victim of his Ostpolitik by reaffirming that “nobody shall be exempt from the burden of 
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history” and that “we cannot accept questioning Israel’s right to exist”.98 It therefore 
was no coincidence that in June 1973, Brandt was the first acting Chancellor who 
visited Israel. In Israel, Brandt reaffirmed the “special historical and moral character” of 
German-Israeli relations while Aharon Yadlin, the general secretary of the Israeli 
Labour party, reminded him that “you will remain the people we are bound to through 
special relations, inevitably”.99 
Brandts successor, Helmut Schmidt, as well as foreign minister Genscher also 
repeatedly confirmed the special quality of German-Israeli relations. Schmidt had the 
honour to host Yitzhak Rabin as the first Israeli Premier Minister to visit Germany 
which, according to Schmidt, was a visit “of a special kind”.100 The Schmidt 
government in 1976 offered Israel a renewal of the bilateral economic aid program that 
resembled the favourable conditions offered only to developing countries. At the same 
time, however, with Israel becoming a strong military and economic power in the 
Middle East and against the background of the Palestinian uprisings, German decision-
makers updated their understanding of Germany’s day-to-day obligations to Israel.101 
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Since Israel’s survival appeared less threatened than in the 1950s when it was 
internationally isolated, Germany felt able to take more critical positions towards Israeli 
policies without risking the security of the Jewish state or violating core elements of its 
own self-identity. Thus, while Germany’s historic guilt required it to stand up for 
Israel’s right to exist, as one SPD member of the Bundestag explained at the height of 
the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli decision-makers should not expect Germany to support 
each and every Israeli decision. Furthermore, the argument was made that Germany’s 
“historical responsibility” indirectly also applied to the suffering of Arabs in the Middle 
East102 and entailed a duty to contribute to a peaceful settlement in the region, 
something already implied by Brandt’s Cologne speech in 1971.  
Although the new German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who came into office in 1982, 
initially caused irritation because his dictum of the “Gnade der späten Geburt” (grace of 
late birth) appeared to question Germany’s ongoing moral debt to Israel,103 his 
government subsequently reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to the special 
relationship. For example, between 1982 and 1987 there have been on average five 
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ministerial visits per year between the two countries104 which shows how deeply 
engrained and routinized the special relations had by then become.  
The stability of the German-Israeli special relationship in the 1970s and 1980s is even 
more remarkable in light of the increasing Europeanisation of Germany’s Middle East 
policies.105 Here, European integration as another source of the Federal Republic’s 
ontological security comes into play. The more Germany developed an identity as a 
European nation and the more it sought to promote European unity also in foreign 
policy, the less it was able to pursue unilateral policies towards the Middle East. Rather, 
it had to find common ground with some decisively pro-Arab countries, most 
importantly France.106 Thus, Germany, much to the dismay of Israel, subscribed to a 
number of EC declarations that called for an Israeli retreat from occupied territories, a 
resettlement of Palestinian refugees and negotiations with the PLO. That being said, 
Israel acknowledged that Germany repeatedly watered down pro-Arab declarations.107 
What is more, Germany, time and again, took care of Israeli economic interests, for 
example by pushing for European-Israeli trade agreements in 1970 and 1975 or by 
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putting on the agenda the establishment of a European-Israeli trade chamber in 1986.108 
It is because of these efforts that Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 1999 called Germany 
“our good ambassador in Europe”.109 
Finally, new challenges for the special relationship appeared to arise with German 
reunification and Israeli fears that, in the words of Prime Minister Shamir, “a reunited 
Germany may constitute a new and deadly threat to all Jews”.110 Yet once again, 
German governments worked to dispel such concerns and remained committed to the 
special relationship. Both Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer left no 
doubt that they accepted Germany’s historical burden and that they regarded Israel as 
one of the most significant others when it came to defining Germany’s foreign policy 
identity. Thus, during his time in office, Schröder reaffirmed Germany’s “particular 
responsibility”, ruled out any boycott or embargo against Israel and defended German 
military aid: 
 Let me say this in the most unmistakable manner: Israel will always get what it 
 needs to uphold its security, at the time when it is needed.111 
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The German government, in line with this promise, successfully blocked proposals for 
EU sanctions against Israel in 2002.112 Foreign minister Fischer later explained that  
Germany unconditionally supports Israel’s right of existence […] This 
 commitment to Israel […] is not negotiable and is the foundation on which the 
special relationship between our two countries is built. It is a cornerstone of 
German foreign policy and will remain so.113 
The fact that Germany and Israel, time and again, were able to defuse critical situations 
and to overcome policy disagreements underlines the ‘specialness’ of their 
relationship.114 The resilience of German-Israeli relations derives from Germany’s 
ontological security needs and Israel’s readiness to contribute to fulfilling these needs. 
Both factors have become stronger, not weaker, over time. The historical record 
suggests that Germany’s ontological security needs were already part of the drivers 
behind the establishment of the special relationship after World War II. As German-
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Israeli relations developed, Germany’s ontological security became ever more entwined 
with this relationship which explains its unshakeable commitment to upholding the 
special relationship. Ontological security seeking has thus been central to the 
establishment and in particular the stability and endurance of the German-Israeli special 
relationship. 
 
The Politics of Maintaining the Special Relationship 
Understanding the German-Israeli special relationship through the lens of ontological 
security offers new perspectives on three interrelated practices of maintaining that 
relationship over time. These practices involve recurrent symbolic reaffirmations of the 
‘specialness’ of the relationship; Israeli reminders of Germany’s moral debt to Israel; 
and the ’silencing’ of critics of the special relationship in German political discourse.  
German-Israeli relations are marked out by recurrent symbolic reaffirmations of the 
special bonds between the two countries. Such affirmations serve as mutual assurances 
and public commitments to the special relationship and are thus integral to the 
ontological security the relationship provides. Among the most significant examples for 
this practice have been high-profile speeches of Israeli Presidents in the Bundestag and 
of German Presidents and Chancellors in the Knesset. While reciprocal invitations to 
speak to the Israeli and German parliaments are in themselves symbolic affirmations of 
  
 
the ‘specialness’ of the relationship, these occasions are also routinely used by both 
sides to emphasize the special character they ascribe to their relations.  
The first Israeli President to speak in the Bundestag was Ezer Weizman in 1996, 
followed by Moshe Katsav in 2005 and Shimon Peres on the occasion of the 
international Memorial Day for the victims of the Shoah in 2010. These speeches were 
recognized as highly symbolic events at the time and received exceptional attention in 
German public debate. They also followed a similar script in the sense that they all built 
bridges between the memory of the Holocaust and the good relations between Israel and 
Germany that have since developed. The Presidents brought back to life the “pillars of 
smoke from the Holocaust”115 and the “memory of the atrocious past”116 which “can 
neither be forgiven nor excused”.117 They reminded their audiences of Germany’s 
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historic guilt and its moral debt to Israel deriving from this guilt, but at the same time 
applauded the “new Germany”118 for recognizing its responsibilities and being a reliable 
supporter of Israel.  
In particular, each President gave expression to the closeness of what have become 
“special relations between Germany and Israel”.119 President Weizman thanked 
Germany for the “friendship” between Israel and Germany and the intimate cooperation 
between the two countries in “economic, security, cultural and many other fields”.120 
President Peres explicitly linked the achievement of special relations to the 
remembrance of the past: 
Unique ties developed between Germany and Israel. The friendship that was 
established did not develop at the expense of forsaking the memory of the 
Holocaust, but from the memory of the dark hours of the past.121 
Such Israeli affirmations of the special quality of German-Israeli relations have been 
significant external validations122 of Germany’s uncertain post-WW II identity, which is 
intrinsically linked to reconciliation with Israel, and thereby contributed to fulfilling 
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Germany’s ontological security needs. That contribution has been recognized and 
valued, in turn, by German governments. In the words of Germany’s then foreign 
minister, Joschka Fischer, at the special session of the UN General Assembly on 24 
January 2005 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi 
concentration camps: “The fact that Israel sees us as a reliable partner today is by no 
means to be taken for granted and fills us with profound gratitude”.123 
Similarly, post-WW II German self-identity has been externally validated by several 
invitations to German Heads of State or Government to visit Israel. These visits have 
been used to affirm that identity and to express Germany’s unwavering commitment to, 
in the words of Joachim Gauck, “the forever special German-Israeli friendship”.124 
Among the most powerful occasions for such symbolic confirmations of the “special 
character”125 of German-Israeli relations have been a number of high-profile speeches 
of German Presidents and Chancellors in front of the Knesset. Having been introduced 
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by the Speaker of the Knesset, Abraham Burg, as “Israel’s greatest friend”126, the 
speech delivered by President Johannes Rau in 2000 is a memorable case in point: 
The relationship between our countries will always be special. In the knowledge 
of what has happened, we keep the memories alive. With the lessons of the past, 
we shape our common future. […] The shared responsibility for Israel is a 
fundamental principle of German foreign policy since the foundation of our 
State.127 
Using similar language, President Horst Köhler in his 2005 speech to the Knesset 
described “the responsibility for the Shoah” as “part of German identity” and declared 
that “between Germany and Israel there cannot be what one calls normality”.128 
Chancellor Angela Merkel also used her 2008 speech to Israel’s parliament, which was 
the first ever speech of a foreign Head of Government in the Knesset, to commit 
Germany to its “unique relationship” to Israel: 
                                                          
126 Kloke (2005). 
127 Bundespräsidialamt, ‘Ansprache vor der Knesset’, Jerusalem (16 February 2000), available at 
{http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Johannes-
Rau/Reden/2000/02/20000216_Rede.html} accessed 22 January 2016. 
128 Bundespräsidialamt, ‘Ansprache von Bundespräsident Horst Köhler vor der Knesset in Jerusalem’, 
Jerusalem (2 February 2005), available at: 
{http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Horst-
Koehler/Reden/2005/02/20050202_Rede.html} accessed 3 April 2016. 
  
 
Germany and Israel are and will always remain linked in a special way by the 
memory of the Shoah. […] Here of all places I want to explicitly stress that 
every German Government and every German Chancellor before me has 
shouldered Germany’s special historical responsibility for Israel’s security. This 
historical responsibility is part of my country’s raison d’être. […] Yes, our 
relations are special, indeed unique – marked by enduring responsibility for the 
past, shared values, mutual trust, abiding solidarity for one another and shared 
confidence. […] In this spirit, Germany will never forsake Israel but will remain 
a true friend and partner.129 
Moreover, such affirmations of the ‘specialness’ of German-Israeli relations by German 
Presidents and Chancellors in Israel represent not only self-assurances of Germany’s 
post-WW II identity but also serve to externally validate Israel’s uncertain collective 
identity as a secure home for Jewish life after the Holocaust.130 This has been 
recognized and welcomed, in turn, by Israel. For example, in his speech to the 
Bundestag in 2010, President Peres explicitly took up Horst Köhler’s 2005 dictum in 
the Knesset that the Shoah was part of Germany’s identity: “We give you great credit 
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for that”.131 In the same speech, Peres emphasized that Israel “will never forget” Angela 
Merkel’s “stirring words of indissoluble support”132 when she pledged that “whoever 
threatens Israel also threatens us” in her 2009 address to the US Congress.133 
More broadly, representatives of both Israel and Germany regularly employ a whole 
range of bilateral and international arenas to express the special character of their 
relationship. On the bilateral level, a recurring occasion for such expressions are the 
regular cabinet-level consultations between the two countries. When Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu visited Berlin for one of the latest of these consultations in 
February 2016, for example, he as a matter of course emphasized the “unique 
partnership which we have today between our two nations”: “When we are in Germany, 
we know we are among good friends”.134 The Israeli Premier Minister thus reaffirmed 
the special relationship despite rising bilateral tensions about Israeli settlement policies 
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and a deepening personal rift between him and Chancellor Angela Merkel. Two years 
earlier, in 2014, Merkel and Netanyahu during a press conference explicitly disagreed 
on the issue of new Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Most tellingly, however, 
Netanyahu, at the same event, honoured the bilateral government consultations as a 
unique form of cooperation and something of utmost historical and emotional 
importance for Holocaust survivors. Both episodes support the view of the special 
relationship as an enduring social institution that is resilient against policy 
disagreements and interpersonal animosities.  
As for international forums, the speech of German foreign minister Fischer at the UN 
General Assembly is a good case in point: 
For us, German-Israeli relations will always have a very special character. The 
State of Israel’s right to exist and the security of its citizens will forever remain 
non-negotiable fixtures of German foreign policy. On that Israel can always 
rely.135 
Taken as a whole, therefore, symbolic reaffirmations of the ‘specialness’ of German-
Israeli relations in various shapes and forms are ubiquitous in this relationship. Such 
reaffirmations, in turn, serve as confirmations of Germany’s biographical narrative and 
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self-identity.136 What is more, mechanisms to maintain the special relations are 
particularly important for the stability of the relationship at times when its special 
character appears to be in doubt or is being questioned. In such “critical situations”137, 
the ontological security needs of Germany pushes it to engage in practices to avoid a 
process of “estrangement”138 that would otherwise produce anxiety and undermine its 
self-identity It is precisely the threat to Germany’s, and to a lesser extent, Israel’s 
ontological security that an existential crisis in their special relationship would entail 
which triggers mechanisms to protect the relationship from such crises.  
Specifically, one important mechanism to this effect consists of Israeli reminders of 
Germany’s moral debt to Israel whenever German representatives appeared to question 
the ‘specialness’ of the relationship. Such reminders highlight the dependency of 
Germany’s post-WW II identity on Israel’s confirmation that Germany lives up to its 
historical responsibilities. They work as threats to Germany’s identity which help 
contain dissonance in German-Israeli relations.139 This pattern is evident, in particular, 
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in Israel’s resistance to any German hints at a ‘normalization’ of the relationship.140 
Such attempts would be countered by Israeli assertions that its moral claims on 
Germany were timeless and that forgiveness for the Holocaust was impossible.141 In 
consequence, this “moral entrapment”142 of Germany works to discredit and undermine 
attempts of German representatives to challenge the ‘specialness’ of German-Israeli 
relations. Remarks of a German foreign minister such as those of Walter Scheel to an 
Israeli newspaper in 1969, that “our relation to Israel resembles our relations to other 
countries […] there is nothing special about it”, while already controversial at the time, 
would virtually be unthinkable today.143  
Along similar lines, Israel invokes reminders to Germany’s historical guilt and moral 
duty to counter German behaviour which it sees as disregarding the special nature of the 
relationship. One of the most prominent cases in point is the fall-out between German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin in April 1981 
after a number of pro-Palestinian statements of Chancellor Schmidt. In response, Begin 
attacked Schmidt for his role in the Wehrmacht in World War II and accused him of a 
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cynical attitude towards the crimes committed by Germans in the Holocaust.144 More 
recent examples include the disappointment expressed by Prime Minister Netanyahu 
with Germany’s abstention in a 2012 UN General Assembly vote to grant Palestine non-
member observer status at the UN and with German criticisms of Israel’s settlement 
policy in the West Bank as well as the complaints of foreign minister Avigdor 
Lieberman to his German counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier in January 2014 that 
Germany did not do enough to support Israel in the international arena.145 Such Israeli 
reproaches that Germany fails to live up to its moral responsibilities, when seen in 
isolation, could well be interpreted as a sign of a disintegrating special relationship, Yet 
inasmuch as they provoke German reaffirmations of its special responsibilities to Israel 
they ultimately contribute to sustaining the relationship. In particular, they link conflicts 
and policy disagreements in German-Israeli relations to German identity needs and 
foreground the significance of the relationship for Germany as a source of ontological 
security. This, in turn, pushes German decision-makers to contain disagreements with 
Israel and to reaffirm their attachment to the special relationship. 
A further mechanism that protects German-Israeli relations from internal challenges can 
be described as the ‘silencing’ or marginalization of voices in the German discourse 
which appear to cross the line between criticizing the policies of Israeli governments 
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and putting into question Germany’s special responsibilities towards Israel. Such voices 
represent threats to Germany’s and Israel’s ontological security and therefore provoke 
rejection within both Germany and Israel. As a case in point, Jürgen W. Möllemann, a 
former German Vice Chancellor and influential figure in the German liberal party 
(FDP) with close ties to Arab business communities, provoked an outcry in the German 
media and the Bundestag, including accusations of anti-Semitism, when he used anti-
Israeli campaign slogans in the 2002 general election campaign which were widely 
condemned across the German political spectrum, not least by the Central Council of 
Jews in Germany. Möllemann was forced to publicly apologize and later resigned from 
his position as leader of the FDP in Germany’s biggest state.146 
A more recent example is the controversial 2012 poem “What must be said” by Günter 
Grass, a German novelist and Nobel laureate in literature, in which he accuses Israel of 
endangering world peace and criticizes the “universal silence” over this in German 
discourse which, Grass argues, is sustained by Germany’s perceived moral obligations 
to Israel. The poem set off an impassioned debate, but the response in Germany and 
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Israel was overwhelmingly negative.147 Perhaps the strongest attack on Grass came 
from a leading conservative broadsheet in Germany which dubbed him “the eternal anti-
Semite”.148 For the American Jewish committee in Berlin, Grass had done “terrible 
harm to German-Israeli friendship”149 and Prime Minister Netanyahu called the poem 
an “absolute scandal” that reveals “a collapse of moral judgment”.150 
 
Power Asymmetries in the Special Relationship 
This part of our case study explores the effects of asymmetric ontological security needs 
on power relations within the German-Israeli relationship. We argue that the greater 
dependency of Germany on the special relationship for its ontological security explains 
why Israel was time and again able to achieve favourable negotiation agreements 
despite Germany’s superior material power resources.  
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The fact that Israeli decision-makers from the beginning of the special relationship were 
aware of the opportunities opened up by this asymmetry in ontological security needs is 
evidenced by internal records of the Israeli Foreign Ministry: 
 We have a somewhat odd relationship with Germany […] As long as there 
remains a feeling of guilt inside Germany, this situation can go on without 
requiring us to offer anything in exchange [for German concessions].151 
Along similar lines, Nahum Goldmann, the President of the World Jewish Congress, 
commented on the negotiations about the Luxembourg accord in 1952 that “we are not 
dealing with a quid pro quo. Nobody is saying to the Germans: You pay us, we forgive 
you.” 152 
To be sure, this approach was occasionally criticized in Germany in the early period of 
the special relationship as an instrumentalization of the past, for example by the Federal 
Republic’s first ambassador to Israel Rolf Friedemann Pauls.153 In the longer term, 
however, German decision-makers came to accept that Germany’s immeasurable 
historical guilt could never be paid off and that its support of Israel was to be permanent 
and unconditional. Adenauer’s remarks after his visit to Israel in 1966 are exemplary in 
this regard:  
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To those who think that restitution must come to an end and that the German 
people cannot condemn itself to the slavery of eternal guilt I want to say that one 
cannot put figures to a moral obligation nor pay it off penny by penny. 154 
What this implies is both a refusal to normalize relations with Israel and the 
understanding that conventional bargaining is inappropriate for Germany in this 
relationship. Most notably, negotiation tactics involving threats to withdraw basic 
material or diplomatic support for Israel would have been at odds with the very core of 
Germany’s foreign policy identity and were therefore anathema to Adenauer and his 
successors. In consequence, as the special relationship stabilised over time, material 
power imbalances and asymmetric policy interdependence in Germany’s favour became 
ever more meaningless.  
The corollary of this was increasing Israeli leverage vis-à-vis Germany. As a recent case 
in point, the German-Israeli negotiations about the delivery of German submarines to 
Israel exemplify how Israeli interlocutors have been able to exploit the ontological 
security needs of their German partners to achieve a highly favourable deal. Our focus 
on this series of talks between 1999 and 2015 is informed by three considerations. First, 
they constitute a critical test for our theoretical argument because of their post-Cold 
War setting. While competing explanatory approaches would expect Germany to enjoy 
superior bargaining power in this period, our analytical perspective suggests that 
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Germany’s ontological security needs after reunification reinforced the dependency of 
its foreign policy identity on the special relationship which should have weakened its 
negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel. Second, the arms deals in question are difficult to 
reconcile with Germany‘s political guidelines for arms exports prohibiting the delivery 
of weapons into conflict areas. German arms exports in the Middle East also regularly 
provoke media criticism and go against public opinion. Any concession to Israel on this 
high-profile issue therefore carried significant reputational costs for Germany both 
domestically and internationally. That Germany still agreed to a deal that met Israel’s 
key demands must remain puzzling from a utilitarian cost-benefit perspective. Third, the 
availability of detailed media reports, some of which based on insider knowledge, 
enables us not only to assess the negotiation outcomes but also to infer initial 
preferences at the outset of the negotiations.  
After the Kohl government agreed to the Israeli procurement of Dolphin-class 
submarines and to considerable German state subsidies, three submarines were 
delivered to Israel in 1999-2000. Criticism at that time was muted, arguably because of 
the progress made in the Middle East peace process. In the early 2000s, after the second 
Intifada and with both Israeli and Palestinian governments refusing to enter into new 
peace talks, further arms deals were more difficult to legitimize. This might explain why 
the red-green government under Chancellor Schröder waited until November 2005, only 
a couple of days before it left office, to authorize the delivery of a fourth and fifth 
  
 
submarine. In 2010, the Merkel-led coalition government started negotiations about 
German financial support for producing a sixth submarine despite widespread 
frustration with increasing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the open scepticism 
of the Israeli leadership towards a two-state solution. Under such adverse political 
circumstances, the Merkel government feared major domestic controversies if it agreed 
to a bilateral deal without renewed reassurances of Israel’s commitment to peaceful 
conflict resolution. As Israel’s ambassador to Berlin between 2008 and 2012, Yoram 
Ben Zeev, recalled: 
The Germans told us: ‘We need to get [the deal] through Parliament; give us 
tools to deal with this’.155 
In this context, it was reportedly Chancellor Merkel herself who, encouraged by a 
similar US position, asked Prime Minister Netanyahu to stop new settlement plans, 
allow the completion of a German-funded sewage treatment plant funded in Gaza and 
unfreeze Palestinian tax money. Yet, Netanyahu refused to meet the first two demands 
and only agreed to authorize financial transactions to the Palestinian authorities after the 
negotiations were in serious deadlock.156 While that relatively small concession enabled 
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the German government to save face domestically and to satisfy some critical voices 
within the coalition parties, it was certainly Israel, not Germany, who had the upper 
hand in these negotiations. 
What is more, a number of public statements of German government officials support 
the conclusion that Germany gave in to Israeli demands in part with a view to the 
detrimental effects of a breakdown of negotiations for Germany’s foreign policy 
identity and its ontological security. For example, German decision-makers consistently 
deny that they were at any point during the negotiations ready to veto the submarine 
deal. Moreover, government statements implicitly confirm that Germany’s 
responsibility for the special relationship was eventually prioritized over other 
normative considerations. Thus, government spokesman Steffen Seibert refused to 
comment on the compatibility of the deal with German export control guidelines and 
instead referred to Chancellor Merkel’s 2007 UN speech in which she had defined 
responsibility for Israel’s existence as part of the Federal Republic’s raison d’état. The 
delivery of submarines, Seibert explained, was a manifestation of that unique 
responsibility.157 More explicitly, Israel’s chief negotiator Ben Zeev acknowledged the 
impact of non-negotiable moral commitments for the negotiating outcome: 
                                                          
157 Süddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Deutsche U-Boote für Israel: Historische Verantwortung sticht politische 
Grundsätze’, (5 June 2012), available at: {http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutsche-u-boote-fuer-
israel-historische-verantwortung-sticht-politische-grundsaetze-1.1374358} accessed 21 May 2016. 
  
 
In the end, responsibility for Israel’s security is a policy principle in Germany 
and a personal principle of Merkel […] With her, this overrides politics, personal 
tensions and any other consideration.158 
Asked why Germany agreed to delivering four battle ships in addition to the sixth 
submarine, Merkel, in 2015, confirmed the exceptional status of German-Israeli 
relations, saying that she believed in the need to provide particular support to Israel 
against the backdrop of the Holocaust.159  
More recently, in October 2017, the German government agreed to provide up to 540 
million Euros in support of another three replacements of Israeli submarines.160 The 
decision was taken despite official Israeli investigations into earlier submarine deals and 
allegations of bribery against the inner circle of the Israeli administration. It is reported 
that the German government initially wanted to postpone the arms deal until all 
investigations were concluded. Yet as expected from an ontological security 
perspective, it quickly changed its position after the Israeli President Reuven Rivlin 
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declared the submarines essential for Israel’s security during his Berlin visit in 
September 2017.161 Only a few weeks later, German decision-makers justified their 
support of the arms deal with references to Germany’s historical responsibility to Israel 
and a government spokesperson emphasized that Germany’s support was unconditional 
and that “no strings were attached”.162 
What is clear from these episodes is that German decision-makers, in each particular 
instance, were unwilling to engage in conventional bargaining with Israel and to risk a 
breakdown of the negotiations. This would have triggered a major crisis in the German-
Israeli special relationship to which Germany’s ontological security is indissolubly tied. 
Germany was therefore not able to get more than a minor concession from Israel. 
Starting out from asymmetries in the ontological security needs of partners to special 
relationships arguably offers a valuable theoretical perspective on power relations and 
negotiation dynamics within such relationships.  
 
Conclusion 
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The German-Israeli reconciliation after the Holocaust and the special relationship 
between the two countries that has since developed stand out among the most 
remarkable and unlikely achievements in post-World War II international politics. How 
this achievement was possible and how German-Israeli relations have developed ever 
since can be fruitfully explored through the lens of ontological security. Specifically, 
the special relationship has been formative for Germany’s and Israel’s identity and is an 
important source of ontological security above all for Germany. Putting the ontological 
security which the relationship provides to Germany centre stage sheds new light on the 
establishment and stability of the special relations as well as on how they are being 
maintained and on how negotiations between Germany and Israel play out. The 
ontological security perspective also serves to emphasize how much Germany, in 
particular, has benefitted from the special relationship and how critical it is for its self-
identity and international reputation. This helps explain why post-unification Germany 
remains fundamentally attached to the special relationship and willing to sign up to 
what in a narrow material sense appear to be uneven bargains in favour of Israel. The 
expectation, therefore, is that the German-Israeli relationship will continue to buck 
trends towards a ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy which have been described, 
for example, with regard to Germany’s approach to international military missions and 
its European policy.163 
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Beyond the case of German-Israeli relations, the broader claim of this article is that the 
concept of ontological security promises to address limitations of existing scholarship 
on special relationships more generally. This is the case in particular regarding the 
motivations of states to establish and uphold special relations, their stability and 
durability, the politics and mechanisms of sustaining special relationships and the power 
relations within them. It would be for further studies to explore to what extent and under 
what conditions that promise holds. Prya Chacko’s study of the development of US-
Indian cooperation indicates that ontological security seeking indeed motivated the 
establishment of a special relationship in another case.164 Scholars might also explore 
the question to what extent the erosion of special relationships can be explained as a 
result of changing ontological security needs as our analysis implies. Ultimately, what is 
needed are comparative research designs to systematically test the plausibility of our 
claims across different cases and contexts. 
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